The material contribution test-or more appropriately, the material contribution to risk approach-is not only a departure from this basic rule, but an exception to it. According to the Supreme Court of Canada, the test is properly confined to cases where there are multiple actors and it is "impossible" to identify, on a balance of probabilities, which actor caused the injury. 5 The underlying goal of corrective justice would still hold the multiplicity of such actors liable on the basis that each actor unreasonably exposed the plaintiff to a risk. According to the Chief Justice, the material contribution to risk test allows a plaintiff to recover damages without proving that one or more defendants caused an injury, recognizing that it is impossible to tell which specific defendant actually caused the injury. 6 The test is a judicially created loophole maintained on policy grounds should the factual scenario ever arise that would make denying a plaintiff damages on the "but for" test unfair or unjust.
Pre-Clements Treatment of Material Contribution to Risk: Hanke v. Resurfice and the Concept of Impossibility
Until Clements, the decision in Resurfice was the most recent authority on the use of material contribution test, although a finding of impossibility under this doctrine proved challenging. Given the reluctance of the Supreme Court to apply this test, the majority in Resurfice developed a doctrine of "impossibility" for use of the "but for" test, affirming that the "but for" test is the presumptive legal test. 7 One essential element in applying the material contribution to risk test requires that unfairness or injustice arise as a result of the application of the "but for" test, due to the impossibility of determining the specific tortfeasor. This limitation is not due to any fault of the plaintiff. The Court previously used the current limits of scientific knowledge as an example of this limitation. The second necessary element for the test is that the plaintiff's injury must fall within the ambit of risk created by a breach of the defendant's duty of care owed to the plaintiff.
(concerning optic nerve atrophy-and eventual blindness-following cataract surgery and the role that postanaesthesia bleeding may have played); Athey v Leonati, [1996] 3 SCR 458 [Athey] (concerning a disc herniation during a "mild" stretching exercise, and the interplay between the appellant's pre-existing back problems and the two motor vehicle accidents he was involved in). 5 Clements, supra note 1 at para 13. 6 Ibid at paras. 
The Decision of the Supreme Court of British Columbia
At the trial, Justice Grauer of the Supreme Court of British Columbia held that although the "but for" test had not been satisfied, there was sufficient evidence that Mr. Clements had materially contributed to Mrs. Clements' injuries due to the motorbike's excessive speed and heavy load. Justice Grauer stated:
[66] Notwithstanding that the science of motorcycle dynamics tells us that the nature of those breaches, excess speed and excess load, will increase the weave instability of the motorcycle in the event of a flat tire, which is what occurred, the plaintiff through no fault of her own is unable to prove that "but for" the defendant's breaches, she would not have been injured. This is because after the fact, it is not possible through accident reconstruction modeling to determine at what combination of lower speed and lesser weight recovery from the weave instability would have been practicable. At the same time, the evidence did not establish that the plaintiff would have suffered harm in the absence of the defendant's breaches. … [75] In short, setting out in poor weather when the operator had not had enough sleep was not what caused the plaintiff's injuries. The plaintiff was injured because, when the rear tire deflated through no one's fault, the defendant was driving too fast with too heavy a load. That cannot be attributed to any fault on the part of the plaintiff.
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On this basis, Justice Grauer, citing Athey and Resurfice, found that Mr. Clements' breach of his duty of care-by driving too fast and with a too heavy a load on the bike-materially contributed to his wife's injuries. 26 Ibid. 27 
The Decision of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia
On appeal, the Court of Appeal for British Columbia set aside the judgment, stating that the necessary causal link had not been established under the "but for" test, and that the material contribution test did not apply in this situation. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Frankel held that:
[64] … once the trial judge determined that Mrs. Clements had failed to establish that the motorcycle would not have capsized but for Mr. Clements's negligence, he should have found that causation had not been proven. This is not a case involving either circular or dependency causation. Rather, it is a case like many others in which, given the current state of knowledge, it is not possible to prove whether the negligent actions of a defendant caused harm. I do not consider it either unfair or unjust, or, to use the words of Professor Knutsen (at 172), "just plain wrong" not to fix Mr. Clements with liability when Mrs. Clements has been unable to show factually that his negligence was a cause of her damages. 28 Mrs. Clements thus appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Canada, where the issue became which form of causation was applicable under these circumstances.
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.
30
Writing for a 7:2 majority, Chief Justice McLachlin combed through the oft-cited 28 Clements (Litigation Guardian of) v Clements, 2010 BCCA 581 at para 64 [Clements Appeal Decision] . 29 Clements, supra note 1 at para 5. 30 Ibid at para 53. The dissenting judges (LeBel and Rothstein) agreed with the Court's views on causation but expressly disapproved of ordering a new trial. Justice LeBel, writing for the dissent, stated:
[55] I have read the Chief Justice's reasons. I agree with the substance of her analysis of the law of causation and the nature of the "but for" test. What, then, the culpable actor has done by his initial negligent act is, first, to have set in motion a dangerous force which embraces the injured person within the scope of its probable mischief; and next, in conjunction with circumstances which he must be held to contemplate, to have made more difficult if not impossible the means of proving the possible damaging results of his own act or the similar results of the act of another. He has violated not only the victim's substantive right to security, but he has also culpably impaired the latter's remedial right of estab-lishing liability. By confusing his act with environmental conditions, he has, in effect, destroyed the victim's power of proof. The legal consequence of that is, I should say, that the onus is then shifted to the wrongdoer to exculpate himself; it becomes in fact a question of proof between him and the other and innocent member of the alternatives, the burden of which he must bear. The onus attaches to culpability, The Court then identified two errors in the reasoning of the trial judge. First, Justice Grauer wrongly required scientific precision in assessing "but for" causation. 39 Second, he incorrectly applied the material contribution test, which should not have been adopted for a "simple single-defendant case." 40 As a result of this, the parties did not receive a hearing based on appropriate legal principles, and the majority therefore ordered that a new trial be held. 41 The Court also indicated that the analysis employed by the Court of Appeal to determine the circumstances in which the material contribution test should be employed was correct, which also implicitly endorsed the approach employed by Professor Erik Knutson in the Dalhousie Law Journal. 42 In the Court of Appeal decision, Justice Frankel held that:
g) The "but for" test rarely fails, and currently only in situations involving circular causation and dependency causation:
1) Circular causation involves factual situations where it is impossible for the plaintiff to prove which one of two or and if both acts bear that taint, the onus or prima facie transmission of responsibility attaches to both, and the question of the sole responsibility of one is a matter between them. 35 Walker Estate v York Finch General Hospital, 2001 SCC 23 (concerning HIV tainted blood supplied by the Canadian Red Cross, who was shown to be negligent in its screening process). 36 Resurfice Corp v Hanke, 2007 SCC 7 (concerning an explosion that occurred due to the ignition of gasoline vapours after water was mistakenly poured into the gas tank of an ice-resurfacing machine). 37 Dependency causation involves factual situations where it is impossible for the plaintiff to prove if a third party would have taken some action in the face of a defendant's negligence and such third party's action would have facilitated harm to the plaintiff; h) If the "but for" test fails, the plaintiff must meet two pre-conditions to utilize the material contribution test for causation:
1) It must be impossible for the plaintiff to prove causation (either due to circular or dependency causation); and, 2)
The plaintiff must be able to prove that the defendant breached the standard of care, exposed the plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of injury, and the plaintiff must have suffered that type of injury.
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The Supreme Court was however reluctant to directly employ an application of "circular causation" 44 or "dependency causation" 45 to avoid complicating the decision.
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Instead, the Court articulated the test in the following manner:
(1) As a general rule, a plaintiff cannot succeed unless she shows as a matter of fact that she would not have suffered the loss "but for" the negligent act or acts of the defendant.... (2) Exceptionally, a plaintiff may succeed by showing that the defendant's conduct materially contributed to risk of the plaintiff's injury, where: 43 Clements Appeal Decision, supra note 28 at para 63. 44 Circular causation is when it is impossible to tell which of multiple potential tortfeasors caused the harm to the plaintiff, as in Cook, supra note 34. 45 Dependency causation is when the causal link between the plaintiff and the defendant is mediated by the action of a third party, as in Walker Estate, supra note 35, and relies on evidence beyond the relationship between the parties that can be difficult to obtain. 46 Clements, supra note 1 at para 45.
(a) the plaintiff has established that her loss would not have occurred "but for" the negligence of two or more tortfeasors, each possibly in fact responsible for the loss; and (b) the plaintiff, through no fault of her own, is unable to show that any one of the possible tortfeasors in fact was the necessary or "but for" cause of her injury, because each can point to one another as the possible "but for" cause of the injury, defeating a finding of causation on a balance of probabilities against anyone.
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The basic notions of fairness and justice (described in Resurfice above) are achieved by dispensing of the usual requirements of "but for" causation in cases where fault has been determined globally against a number of tortfeasors and a specific responsible defendant is not identifiable. 48 The Court also left open the rare possibility of a single tortfeasor, as described in Snell.
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THE PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF Clements v. Clements
The decision in Clements provided clarity on the material contribution test, especially in light of the ambiguity around Resurfice, Athey and Snell. 50 Recourse to the material contribution test should be rare. It should only be invoked where multiple putative wrongdoers make the "but for" test "impossible" to meaningfully apply. The Chief Justice emphasized that use of the material contribution to risk approach is rare because the elimination of causation is a radical departure from the negligence analysis. 51 Further, she reiterated that the facts alone might demonstrate negligence.
The negligence analysis has never required scientific proof of causation, and so a lack of scientific evidence cannot be used to remove the requirement for the "but for" test.
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Thus, the Supreme Court is promoting the use of a "global but for" test, to be applied in practically all negligence situations. The Court also affirmed the policy reasons for retaining the material contribution to risk test. The Chief Justice indicated that, in the rare circumstances which necessitate the use of this test, the goals of negligence law would be met by justly providing compensation for injury, but only against defendants that failed to act with appropriate care. 54 Here the Court also hinted at the ultimate purpose of this judicially created fiction-a general deterrence against potential tortfeasors who would otherwise seek to escape liability by blaming others. However, the effectiveness of this test as a deterrent (either through in-house counsel conducting risk management analysis, or defence lawyers assessing potential liability) is questionable, considering the Court's reluctance to identify a specific factual scenario where it would be applicable. Those cases that could effectively use the material contribution test at the trial level may be settled (or not appealed) perhaps because of reluctance by defence counsel to have judicial findings on a factual scenario that could broaden the applicability of the test.
Clements also provides a comprehensive review of the Canadian and English jurisprudence on the material contribution test, examining relevant cases which demonstrate a 'common sense' approach to the "but for" test. Some will quibble that, in surveying these cases and providing examples, the Court did not draw 'enough' of a bright line-or a 'brighter' line-between applying the "but for" test and the material contribution test. We disagree. The Court was mindful of the specific case before it, and left open the possibility that future cases (like toxic tort litigation) 55 might also benefit from the material contribution test. The cases discussed by the Court for future applications did refer to traditional mesothelioma cancer litigation, one of the classical 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid at para 41. 55 Clements, supra note 1 at para 44:
[44] This is not to say that new situations will not raise new considerations. I leave for another day, for example, the scenario that might arise in mass toxic tort litigation with multiple plaintiffs, where it is established statistically that the defendant's acts induced an injury on some members of the group, but it is impossible to know which ones.
applications of the material contribution test. 56 The Court also indicated that scientific knowledge may one day provide the factual basis to identify asbestos specific to a single employer, which in turn caused a claimant's mesothelioma, providing the factual proof that would render the material contribution test inapplicable. 57 Although the material contribution test may seem appealing to plaintiffs in medical malpractice actions, (indeed, a significant portion of material contribution litigation before Clements was in medical malpractice), there are some strategic hurdles that plaintiffs will have to overcome. Causation under the new "global but for" approach would appear to require proof that all of these defendants owed a duty of care and breached the standard by acting negligently. If a plaintiff fails to demonstrate negligence on the part of any one of these defendants, they will have failed to prove causation on a "global but for" basis. This significantly multiplies the risk for plaintiffs at trial. Defence lawyers will also be tempted under these circumstances to adduce evidence about non-tortious causes that are more likely sources of injury than the "global but for" standard. 58 Plaintiffs in medical malpractice actions may therefore find the material contribution test after Clements unfeasible and too risky to employ. Finally, it is also unclear whether the application of Clements in a dependency causation type of material contribution test will be helpful for certain high profile public interest cases. Civil claims regarding police inaction in incidents of domestic violence and sexual assault provide problematic chain of causation issues, and yet contain strong policy reasons for finding liability, to ensure public protection and responsibility. 59 This remains one of the redeeming qualities of the material contribution test-it usually works in favour of the plaintiff because causation against a defendant (as opposed to the defendant) whose behaviour increased the risk of harm can usually be established. As Professor Erik Knutson stated in the Resurfice era, "material contribution has the potential to create liability for breach of a standard of care plus risk creation." 60 For now, we are simply waiting for the right plaintiff and the right risks to justify its use on grounds of fairness and justice.
IV. CONCLUSION
The limits of science are often a justification for asserting impossibility, but they are not the cause of a logical impossibility, which is now clearly required to apply the "but for" test. Plaintiffs will not be able to rely on a material contribution test simply because the factual record makes it impossible to apply a "but for" test, unless the factual uncertainty relates to the identification of a specific tortfeasor. Consequently, Clements could signal an even more restrictive approach to using material contribution than what has occurred since Resurfice. Future courts may adopt and advance Professor Knutsen's classification and terminology of circular and dependency causation, which should help refine the analysis of how and why the material contribution test is being applied. As the material contribution test is essentially a judicial loophole created for public policy reasons to deal with particularly complex or unusual facts, it is likely that the doctrine will continue to evolve in the years to come.
Prior to Clements, Vaughn Black and David Cheifetz summarized the state of the law as follows: "Two important questions have reigned since the approval of the material-contribution test: when is that test available and what is its content?" 61 Although Clements may have shed some light on both questions by removing some of the ambiguous language surrounding previous decisions, what most spectators (including trial level judges) are still waiting for are those rare circumstances where the Court deems a fact scenario appropriate for application of the material contribution test. That day may not arrive any time soon. As Ryan Krushelnitzky and Peter Gibson state, Just like the unicorn, the "material contribution" test is a rare and "different beast", and given the right set of circumstances, might be spotted one day in a Canadian courtroom, but every reported sighting [at the Supreme Court level] so far has proven to be a hoax. 62 
